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Trent Gaither* and Ron Rainey**
ONSTITUTIONAL principles, statutes, and case law relating to
criminal procedure envelop more issues and nuances than any Sur-
vey article can hope to cover. The issues pervade all aspects of any
criminal case and the nuances sometimes appear to turn more on the facts of
the given case than on prior authority. Even a cursory review of recent deci-
sions, however, provokes one conclusion: The Texas Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure are not "rules" in the truest sense of the word, but rather principles
and guidelines to be examined, expanded, or constricted in application to a
given set of facts and circumstances as the diligent and cautious trial lawyer
deems appropriate. In most instances, there is no single standard, no single
application. The principles espoused by the judiciary are, in a very real sense,
confined only by the restraints of the creative lawyer's imagination. It is the
hope of the authors that this article will provide a base from which those
creative thoughts may spring.
I. SEARCHES, ARRESTS, AND CONFESSIONS
In Eisenhaur v. State I the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals finally took
the long anticipated step of holding that, for purposes of search and seizure,
article 1, section 9 of the Texas Constitution is in all respects the same as the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 As expected, the
court did not unanimously agree in its analysis of the issue; however, the net
result of the decision requires that Texas henceforth follow the "totality of
circumstances" test set forth in Illinois v. Gates.3 Meanwhile, in Stanton v.
* B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Houston. Attorney at Law, Haynes
Fullenweider, Houston, Texas.
** B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; J.D., University of Houston; Attorney at Law,
Haynes & Fullenweider, Houston, Texas.
1. 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
2. Id. at 164. The court stated:
In this area, the laws and constitution of the State of Texas impose no greater
restrictive standard, leaving the Texas Courts free to follow the lead of the
Supreme Court of the United States. There being no binding authority to the
contrary, today's opinion is made to stay in step with the Federal Constitutional
model for probable cause determination.
Id.
3. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The test requires a reviewing court to determine if the totality of
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State4 the court found the totality of the circumstances insufficient to sup-
port a search and seizure that resulted in a conviction for aggravated rob-
bery. In Stanton police arrested Tony Sastaita for the robbery of a local
restaurant. During interrogation, Sastaita implicated defendant Stanton in
the crime and identified him from a photograph. Sastaita also revealed Stan-
ton's first name, his place of residence, and a description of his car. Several
hours later, a police officer saw what he believed to be Stanton's car parked
in the driveway of a residence. As the result of a stakeout, police arrested
Stanton in the parked car when he left the residence. Upon arrest, Stanton
confessed to the armed robbery. On appeal, Stanton argued that his war-
rantless arrest was unlawful and thereby tainted his subsequented confes-
sion. The state argued that the police had lawfully arrested Stanton without
a warrant because Stanton was "escaping" as that term is used in article
14.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.5 In rejecting the state's
position, the court held that "escape" as used in article 14.04 necessarily
entails some aspect of fleeing. 6 That is, the state must produce some evi-
dence that the defendant knowingly made an effort to elude the police. 7
In Williams v. States an unidentified woman reported a suspicious truck.
Subsequently, the officers saw a truck fitting the description with defendant
Williams standing nearby. The police officers approached the truck, looked
inside, and saw about an inch of the stock of a rifle protruding from beneath
a towel in the cab. One of the officers lifted the towel and discovered a stack
of guns that he immediately seized. Police later determined that the guns
had been stolen. The state relied on the plain view doctrine to validate the
search and seizure. The court held that the plain view doctrine did not apply
because it was not "immediately apparent" to the police officers that the
guns were evidence of any crime.9 Absent this factor, police did not have
probable cause to seize the weapons. 10
In Crosby v. State I the court discussed whether an administrative search
may include the search of a dressing room in a nightclub.12 The defendant,
the circumstances provided a substantial basis for probable cause prior to both warrantless and
warrant seizures of persons or property.
4. 743 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
5. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977) states:
Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representa-
tion of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender
is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace
officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.
6. 743 S.W.2d at 236-37.
7. Id. at 236 ("The mere fact of driving away from one's own house in the morning a day
or so after the offense, without more, is not sufficient to show escape in terms of the statues").
8. 743 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
9. Id. at 644.
10. Id. The court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971), as dispositive
of the case. Coolidge set forth three circumstances that must be satisfied before the plain view
doctrine applies: (1) the officers must lawfully be on the premises; (2) the officers must inad-
vertently discover the incriminating evidence, and (3) it must be "immediately apparent" to
the officers that the evidence is related to a crime. 743 S.W.2d at 644; see also White v. State,
729 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (similar rendition of test).
11. 750 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
12. Id. at 770.
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Crosby, was performing at a Dallas nightclub, which was licensed to sell
alcoholic beverages by the Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission.13 During a
routine inspection for liquor violations, police officers went backstage and
entered Crosby's private dressing room. There the officers discovered co-
caine and a .45 Colt automatic pistol. The court found that the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy by virtue of his private dressing
area.' 4 The police officers exceeded the scope of any legitimate search au-
thorized by the administrative inspection provisions of the Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Code; the court held that the search violated both article 1, section
9 of the Texas Constitution and the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution. ' 5
In Vicknair v. State 16 a police officer stopped the defendant because of a
cracked taillight on the defendant's car. The officer asked the defendant for
his driver's license, but the defendant did not have one. The officer then
arrested the defendant and subsequently discovered over five pounds of ma-
rijuana in plain view in the car. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on
motion for rehearing held that a damaged taillight, not so significantly
cracked as to present a safety hazard, did not constitute an equipment viola-
tion under traffic regulation rules.17 Consequently, the court found the ini-
tial detention of the accused unlawful and suppressed evidence recovered in
a subsequent search of the vehicle.18
Green v. State 19 similarly dealt with the propriety of an investigatory stop.
A police officer, observed defendant Green's car parked in a cafeteria park-
ing lot. A woman parked her car beside Green's and entered the passenger
side of his car. She left Green's car about two minutes later and drove away
in her own car. A second car then pulled up. The driver of the second car
got out and entered Green's car. Suspicious, the police officer approached,
searched the car, and found cocaine in a blue bag inside a shaving kit on the
floor of the car. The court reversed the conviction and held that the police
officer improperly detained the defendant because the events he observed
were as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity. 20
In Jones v. State2 1 a police officer responded to a dispatch call regarding a
suspicious black male wearing a gray T-shirt. The dispatch did not indicate
why the black male was suspicious or that a crime had taken place. Upon
arriving, the officer confronted the defendant and noticed that he was very
nervous. The defendant was carrying a blanket that he placed on the ground
13. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 101.04 (Vernon 1977) states: "By accepting a license
or permit, the holder consents that the commission, an authorized representative of the com-
mission, or a peace officer may enter the licensed premises at any time to conduct an investiga-
tion or inspect the premises for the purpose of performing any duty imposed by this code."
14. 750 S.W.2d at 778.
15. Id. at 780.
16. 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
17. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 670 1(d), § Ill (Vernon 1977).
18. 751 S.W.2d at 187.
19. 744 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.).
20. Id. at 314 (citing Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
21. 746 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst. Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
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while searching for identification. The blanket fell open, and the police of-
ficer observed a video cassette recorder. The officer arrested the defendant
for suspicion of burglary. The officer then found other items in the blanket
and called the dispatcher to inquire whether any one had recently reported a
burglary. The defendant voluntarily offered to take the officer to the house
he had burglarized. The court held that the evidence should have been sup-
pressed by the trial court because the officer had made an initial unlawful
arrest. 22 Further, the defendant's confession also should have been sup-
pressed because the state failed to prove that the the illegal arrest did not
affect the statement. 23
In Carver v. State24 a motel owner notified police that a person he sus-
pected of previously damaging one of his rooms had returned and rented
another room at the motel. After placing the room under surveillance for
several hours, the police informed the owner that they were powerless but
that he had the right to request the defendant, Carver, to leave the room.
The owner called Carver and asked him to leave, which he did. As he was
leaving, the police approached and asked him for identification. One of the
police officers noticed a capped-off length of pipe on the floor board of
Carver's vehicle. Thinking that the object was a pipe bomb, the officer called
in the bomb squad. After removing from the pipe from the car, the bomb
squad discovered that it was empty. Without explanation, the police then
opened the locked trunk of the vehicle and discovered a second length of
capped-off pipe in a bag. Inside this pipe, the bomb squad officers discovered
methamphetamine. The appellate court held that the initial detention was
proper pursuant to the articulable suspicion test.25 The court, however, re-
versed the conviction because the search should have ended when police de-
termined that the pipe found on the floor of the vehicle was not illegal. 26
In Commander v. State27 the defendant was convicted of carrying a pro-
hibited weapon-a knife-after being arrested for public intoxication in a
private residential driveway. The court reversed the conviction and held
that the driveway was not "public" as defined by the Texas Penal Code. 28
Therefore, the detention and arrest were illegal and tainted the subsequent
search that produced the prohibited weapon. 29
Two significant cases addressed whether the court may admit statements
22. Id. at 284.
23. Id. at 286 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)).
24. 746 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
25. Id. at 871 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Under the articulable suspicion
test, temporary detention of a defendant does not require a prior determination of probable
cause. Rather, a court determines the reasonableness of a temporary detention in light of
specific and articulable facts known to the detaining officer at the time of detention. 746
S.W.2d at 870-71.
26. Id. at 871.
27. 748 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
28. Id. at 271. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(29) (Vernon 1979) defines public place as
"any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but
is not limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment
houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops."
29. 748 S.W.2d at 271.
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or confessions made after proper initial detention. In Meek v. State30 the
defendant's estranged wife implicated him as an arson suspect. Based on
this information, the fire investigator arranged to interview the defendant.
He brought the defendant into his office, placed him in handcuffs, and gener-
ally intimidated him. Not surprisingly, the defendant confessed. At trial the
investigator testified that he never read the defendant his Miranda rights
because he never considered the defendant a suspect during the interview.
The court of appeals, however, did not accept that testimony and reversed
the conviction, holding that the statements were inadmissable because they
arose from custodial interrogation without the requisite constitutional
warnings. 31
In contrast the police in Maixner v. State32 read defendant Maixner, a
murder suspect, his rights immediately upon arriving at the police station
following his arrest. Maixner nevertheless expressed a desire to discuss the
murder. Not believing their good fortune, the police officers terminated the
conversation and told Maixner he was free to leave. Maixner refused and
insisted upon telling the police officers about his involvement in the murder.
The court held the confession admissible.33
II. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Charging Instruments
In Whitehead v. State34 the defendant was convicted of felony theft of
timber. Defendant Whitehead's pretrial motion to quash alleged that the
indictment failed to describe the number or kind of timber that Whitehead
allegedly stole and the indictment failed to allege that the $10,000 total value
was calculated by aggregating the values of the stolen property.35 The trial
court overruled his motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. 36 The court
of criminal appeals overruled the court of appeals and reversed the convic-
tion.37 The court held that the state may obtain a single conviction for
felony theft by aggregating the values of property taken pursuant to a con-
tinuing course of conduct. Such aggregation, however, is an element of the
offense that must be included in the indictment. 38 In Gengnagel v. State39
the defendant was convicted of indecent exposure pursuant to section 21.08
30. 747 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, pet. granted).
31. Id. at 31.
32. 753 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
33. Id. at 157-58.
34. 745 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
35. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.09 (Vernon 1974) states: "When amounts are obtained
in violation of this chapter pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, whether
from the same or several sources, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the
amounts aggregated in determining the grade of the offense."
36. Whitehead v. State, 710 S.W.2d 645, 658 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986), rev'd, 745
S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
37. 745 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
38. Id. at 376. In reaching this determination, the court relied on the general rule that the
state must plead everything it intends to prove. See Harrell v. State, 643 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982); Vincent State, 626 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
39. 748 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of the Texas Penal Code. 4° The court of criminal appeals reversed the con-
viction, finding that the information did not inform the defendant of the
nature of his alleged recklessness.41 In so holding, the court stated that arti-
cle 21.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure4 2 requires specific allega-
tions of acts and circumstances that indicate that the accused was aware of
the risk that another person would be offended by his act and that the ac-
cused acted in conscious disregard of that risk.43 A more significant impact
of this decision may be that because the court found the charging instrument
fundamentally defective, consequently, the defendant's failure to raise the
defect in a motion to quash prior to trial did not waive the error for review.
The court distinguished an information that fails to allege acts demon-
strating recklessness from an information that fails to allege the acts with
reasonable certainty that constitute recklessness. 44 The court held that arti-
cle 21.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure when combined with
section 21.98 of the Texas Penal Code requires that acts demonstrating reck-
lessness or criminal negligence become elements of the offense. 45
De Vaughn v. State46 involved an attempted burglary in which the defend-
ant allegedly entered a habitation and committed theft without the effective
consent of the owner. The defendant, by way of pretrial motion to quash,
complained that the indictment failed to provide adequate notice for him to
prepare a defense because it failed to allege the elements of burglary, includ-
ing a description of the property that the defendant allegedly had stolen and
the name of the owner of the property. The court of criminal appeals held
that when the state alleges burglary by way of an actually completed theft
the state must, upon proper request, provide specific information regarding
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08(a) (Vernon 1974) states: "A person commits an
offense if he exposes his anus or any part of his genitals with intent to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another is present who will be
offended or alarmed by his act."
41. 748 S.W.2d at 228. The charging information alleged, in part, that defendant:
did then and there expose to Kenneth Gore, his genitals with intent to arouse
and gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, and the said defendant did so
recklessly and in conscious disregard of whether another person was present
who would be offended and alarmed by such act, to-wit: exposition of his geni-
tals by the defendant to complainant.
Id. The information closely tracked the indecent exposure statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.08(a) (Vernon 1979).
42. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.15 (Vernon 1977) provides:
Whether negligence enters into or is a part or element of any offense, or it is
charged that the accused acted negligently or with negligence in the committing
of an offense, the complaint, information, or indictment in order to be sufficient
in any such case must allege, with reasonable certainty, the act or acts relied
upon to constitute negligence, and in no event shall it be sufficient to allege
merely that the accused, in committing the offense, acted negligently or with
negligence.
43. 748 S.W.2d at 230.
44. Id. at 229.
45. The court's analysis in Gengnagel may apply to any offense in the Texas Penal Code
or other criminal statute that requires recklessness or criminal negligence as an element of the
offense.
46. 749 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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the property allegedly stolen. 47 The court's opinion implies that if the prose-
cution had been for unlawful entry with intent to commit theft, then more
specific pleading would not have been required.48 Nevertheless, having de-
termined that the indictment failed to provide sufficient notice, the court
remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial
court's error had an impact on the defendant's ability to prepare a defense
and, if so, how great an impact. 49
In DWI cases, the information must specify the defendant's particular
manner and means of intoxication. The court of criminal appeals in Garcia
v. State 50 found that the type of intoxicant used by a defendant is an element
of the offense that the state must specify to satisfy its burden of proof.5'
Previously, in Solis v. State,52 the San Antonio court of appeals similarly
held that the state must specify, if asked to do so in a timely manner, which
definition of "intoxicated" 53 it intends to prove. The San Antonio court in
Ray v. State 54 subsequently limited Solis by holding that, although the state
must specify the manner and means of intoxication, a pleading is not insuffi-
cient unless it affects the defendant's ability to prepare a defense. 55 The
court also held that, when the record does not include a statement of facts,
the reviewing court need not evaluate the prejudicial result. 56 Consequently,
in Walker v. State57 the San Antonio court summarily confirmed a convic-
tion of driving while intoxicated because the appellant to failed bring the
statement of facts forward on appeal. 58
B. Former Jeopardy
In Strickland v. State 59 the court considered whether double jeopardy
arose as a result of the trial court's sua sponte granting of a mistrial over the
defendant's objection. The trial granted the mistrial because one of the im-
paneled and sworn jurors moved out of the county before the trial con-
47. Id. at 71.
48. Id. (citing Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).
49. 749 S.W.2d at 71 (citing Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986)).
50. 747 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
51. Id. at 381.
52. 742 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, pet. granted).
53. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1989) defines "intoxication"
as: "(A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduc-
tion of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, or a combination of two or more of those
substances into the body; or (B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more." The court
in Soils apparently separated subsections (A) and (B) into two distinct categories: loss of facul-
ties and alcohol concentration of greater than 0.10. Query: Does not the loss of faculties
provision of subpart (A) envision two ways of losing faculties, that is, loss of normal mental or
physical faculties. Perhaps only time will tell.
54. 749 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no pet.).
55. Id. at 942.
56. Id.
57. 751 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no pet.).
58. Id. at 269.
59. 741 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.).
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cluded. The court then held a second trial before a jury of twelve, and the
defendant was convicted.
The appellate court reversed the conviction because the grant of a mistrial
was not of "manifest necessity."' 6 Rather the trial court should have uti-
lized one of two various alternatives. 61 If the juror was disabled, the trial
court should have continued the trial with eleven jurors pursuant to the pro-
visions of article 36.29 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 62 If the
juror was not disabled, the trial court should have advised the defendant that
the trial would continue with twelve jurors unless the defendant agreed to
proceed with eleven jurors or asked for mistrial.63
In State v. Herrera " the state appealed from a grant of habeas corpus
relief based upon theories of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The El
Paso court of appeals held that the defendant, who was acquitted of deadly
assault on a peace officer, could not be tried for capital murder of a peace
officer. 65 Herrera was charged with both offenses, and the prosecutor elected
to try the deadly assault case first. The defendant was acquitted. The court
held that since deadly assault on a peace officer can be a lesser offense to
capital murder, the acquittal on the lesser offense operated as an acquittal on
the greater.66
In Ex Parte Stevens 67 the state tried the defendant first for aggravated
rape and later for the lesser included offense of rape, both arising from the
same incident. The Dallas court of appeals held that acquittal of the greater
offense of aggravated rape precludes prosecution for a lesser included offense
for which the defendant could have been convicted during the original trial,
even though the latter was not specifically alleged in the first indictment. 68
C. Speedy Trial
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the Speedy Trial Act 69 in
Meshell v. State.70 In Branscum v. State71 the Amarillo court of appeals
considered whether a twenty-two-year delay between the date of an offense
and the trial denied the accused his rights under both (1) the United States
and Texas Constitutions and (2) the Texas Speedy Trial Act. Pursuant to
Meshell, the court rejected the Speedy Trial Act, but reversed the convic-
tion 72 based on the four-factor test of Barker v. Wingo.73
60. Id. at 552.
61. Id. at 553.
62. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 32.69 (Vernon 1977).
63. 741 S.W.2d at 553.
64. 754 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1988, no pet.).
65. Id. at 797.
66. Id. (citing Parker v. State, 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Ex parte Gutier-
rez, 600 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
67. 753 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.).
68. Id. at 212 (citing Ex Parte Neilson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); Privett v. State, 635 S.W.2d
746, 752 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.)).
69. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 1(1) (Vernon 1977).
70. 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (Texas Speedy Trial Act unconstitutional).
71. 750 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no pet.).
72. Id. at 894-895.
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III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL
A. Voir Dire
The most significant issue relating to the voir dire stage of criminal trial
proceedings revolved around the United States Supreme Court ruling in Bat-
son v. Kentucky 74 and its Texas counterpart embodied in article 35.261 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 75 The Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals opinion in Keeton v. State76 represents an exhaustive analysis of how
Batson is to be applied in Texas jurisprudence. 77 Judge Miller reviewed a
variety of decisions from other jurisdictions relating to Batson's application
around the country and ultimately approved a conceptional analysis of sev-
eral of those opinions in applying both procedural and substantive aspects of
Batson to a particular case.
A reading of Keeton establishes some general principles in relation to Bat-
son. First, whether the prosecutor exercises challenges in a racially discrimi-
nating manner is not to be judged by an objective test; rather, the trial judge
must assess the explanations both objectively. and subjectively with a view
toward the voir dire examination as a whole. 78 Second, five articulated fac-
tors weigh heavily against the legitimacy of any race-neutral explanation.
These factors are:
1) an explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not
shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically;
2) no examination or only a perfunctory examination of the chal-
lenged juror;
3) disparate examination of the challenged juror, i.e., questioning
73. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The primary factors a court must consider are: (1) length of
delay between the time an accused is formerly accused or arrested and trial; (2) the reason for
the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial or made a demand for
a trial; (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Id. at 531.
74. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
75. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon Supp. 1989) provides:
(a) After the parties have delivered their lists to the clerk under Article
35.26 of this code and before the Court has impaneled the jury, the defendant
may request the court to dismiss the array and call a new array in the case. The
court shall grant the motion of a defendant for dismissal of the array if the court
determines that the defendant is a member of an identifiable racial group, that
the attorney representing the state exercised peremptory challenges for the pur-
pose of excluding persons from the jury on the basis of their race, and that the
defendant has offered evidence of relevant facts that tend to show that chal-
lenges made by the attorney representing the state were made for reasons based
on race. If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the attorney representing the state to give a racially neutral explanation for the
challenges. The burden of persuasion remains with the defendant to establish
purposeful discrimination.
(b) If the court determines that the attorney representing the state challenged
prospective jurors on the basis of race, the court shall call a new array in the
case.
76. 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
77. It should be noted that Keeton did not address the question of the application of
article 35.261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statutory enactment was not yet in
effect at the time the Keeton case went to trial. It is unlikely, however, that the application of
Batson is going to differ significantly from the provisions of the codification.
78. 749 S.W.2d at 866.
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challenged venireperson as to evoke a certain response without asking
the same question of other panel members;
4) the reason given for the challenge is unrelated to the facts of the
case; and
5) disparate treatment where there is no difference between responses
given and unchallenged venirepersons. 79
Third, the trial court is to examine reasons given by the prosecutor for exer-
cising challenges.80 These reasons are then to be evaluated in light of other
circumstances and the court's own knowledge of trial tactics to determine
whether the reasons given by the prosecutor are contrived in order to avoid
admitting discrimination."' Finally, it is clear that the defendant is allowed
to offer evidence in support of his Batson motion.82 In reviewing the trial
court's decision, appellate courts will not invoke a "clearly erroneous" or
"abuse of discretion" standard. Rather, the focus will be on whether pur-
poseful discrimination was established through the record. In review, the
appellate court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's rulings and determine if the record supports the rulings.83
In a related case, Levy v. State,84 the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals, considered whether a trial court must enter specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law pursuant to a Batson hearing. The court concluded
that, while doing so may be the better practice, Batson does not require a
trial court to enter specific findings and conclusions if it determines that the
state did not purposefully discriminate based on race.85 In Miller-El v.
State,86 a pre-Batson case, the prosecutor directed ten of his fourteen per-
emptory challenges at black venirepersons, striking ten of the eleven origi-
nally on the panel. Although the prosecutor left one black person on the
jury, the court of criminal appeals held that the defendant had raised the
issue of purposeful discrimination8 7 and abated the appeal to permit the trial
court to conduct a full hearing pursuant to Keeton.88
In other significant voir dire issues, the past year may be remembered as
the year of the misleading hypothetical. In Lane v. State,89 a capital murder
case, the prosecutor used a hypothetical situation to try to explain to the
venirepersons the difference between "intentionally" for purposes of deter-
mining guilt and "deliberate" in answering the first special issue supporting
79. Id. (quoting Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
80. Id. at 867.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 868.
83. Id. at 870.
84. 749 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
85. Id. at 179. The court also noted that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has con-
strued Batson to require a trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law if the trial
court determines that a defendant has established purposeful racial discrimination. Id. (citing
DeBlanc v. State, 732 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Williams v. State, 731 S.W.2d
563, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
86. 748 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
87. Id. at 460.
88. 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
89. 743 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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the death penalty. 90 The hypothetical involved the armed robbery of a con-
venience store in which the robber fired a shot into the ceiling and the bullet
ricocheted and killed a convenience store clerk. The prosecutor character-
ized this hypothetical as an example of a deliberate killing pursuant to sec-
tion 19.02 of the Texas Penal Code.91 The court held that the hypothetical
represented a blatant misstatement of the law of capital murder.92 Conse-
quently, the explanation created a false distinction between the terms "inten-
tional" and "deliberate." Furthermore, the state used the same hypothetical
with each juror who admitted difficulty in making a distinction between the
two terms. Consequently, the inaccuracy of the hypothetical could only
have confused the juror's common sense impression of intentional and delib-
erate conduct, forcing a reversal of the conviction.93 In the later case of
Morrow v. State94 the court was again confronted with the almost identical
hypothetical as that in Lane, with the same result.95 In Felder v. State96 the
"shooting into the ceiling" hypothetical was again used by the prosecutor,
but was held not to be the controlling issue. In this case, defense counsel
through his voir dire examination established that a venireperson could not
distinguish between "intentional" and "deliberate" killings. The venireper-
son could not conceive of any case in which, if he found the accused guilty of
murder, he would not also answer "yes" to the question of "deliberate." 97
The court of criminal appeals held that the defendant's challenge for cause
should have been sustained.98 Additionally, Felder v. State can be cited for
the proposition that a potential juror who cannot honestly say that he would
not consider parole when deciding on punishment for the accused, if found
guilty, is subject to exclusion upon proper challenge.99
90. Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that, in a death case,
the jury be submitted three special issues, the first of which is "whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result." TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
91. Apparently, the prosecutor attempted to bring the hypothetical within subsection (2),
and (3) of § 19.02, which provides:
(2) A person commits an offense if he:
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than voluntary or invol-
untary manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission
or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits
or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of an individual.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974). The prosecutor, however, characterized the
conduct as capital murder when it could not conceivably be construed as conduct supporting
capital murder.
92. 743 S.W.2d. at 627.
93. Id.
94. 753 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
95. Id. at 376; see also Gardner v. State 730 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (im-
proper hypothetical used to demonstrate difference between "intentional" and "deliberate"
murder).
96. 758 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
97. Id. at 769.
98. Id. at 770.
99. Id. at 766.
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Nichols v. State oo does not break any new legal ground, but does provide
insight into the distinction and preservation of error in "qualified"'101 versus
"disqualified" 10 2 jurors. In this case, the trial judge sua sponte excused a
prospective juror because he was apparently preoccupied by his employment
and his upcoming wedding. The question of whether the trial court erred
and, if so, whether the error was reversible, depended on whether the juror
in question was a "qualified" juror or a "disqualified" juror. If the former,
the defendant must show harm by the fact the state exhausted its peremp-
tory challenges and, except for the court's action, the juror would have
served.'0 3 If the latter, harm is shown only when the defendant establishes
that he was tried by a jury to which he had a legitimate objection.104 The
court held that the trial court erred in excluding the juror in question on its
own motion, but because the juror's preoccupation with other matters made
him subject to a challenge for cause, the juror fell within the "disqualified"
juror category.10 5 Thus, in order to establish harm, the appellant must show
that he was either forced to exercise a peremptory strike to prevent a dis-
qualified juror from sitting or that he was forced to accept an objectionable
juror in the prospective juror's place.' 0 6 In this case, the defendant failed to
show any harm resulting from the trial court's error.
B. Evidentiary Matters
Re-enactment Videotape. In Miller v. State'0 7 the court of criminal ap-
peals held that a videotape re-enactment of an automobile ride in a murder
case was admissible because it showed only the route taken and did not actu-
ally show any re-enacted criminal activity. 108 In so holding, the court distin-
guished the case of Lopez v. State,109 in which the Fort Worth court of
appeals reversed a conviction for aggravated delivery of marijuana because
of the improper admission of a videotape re-enactment of the criminal
offense.
100. 754 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
101. A "qualified" juror is one who is not subject to a challenge for cause pursuant to the
requirements of art. 35.16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Rougeau v. State, 738
S.W.2d 651, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 856 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985).
102. A "disqualified" juror is one who is properly subject to a challenge for cause. The
court noted that it is axiomatic that the trial judge should never sua sponte excuse a prospec-
tive juror unless the juror is absolutely disqualified from serving on a jury. 754 S.W.2d at 193.
The requirements for absolute disqualification are set forth in art. 35.19 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides generally that no juror should be impaneled who has been
convicted of theft or any felony, that is under indictment of other legal accusation for theft or
any felony, or is insane.
103. 754 S.W.2d at 193 (citing Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 795-96 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 194.
106. Id.
107. 741 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
108. Id. at 388.
109. 651 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 664
S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
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Doctrine of Curative Admissibility. 110 In Nehman v. State I 11 the state in-
troduced the defendant's confession, but deleted exculpatory portions that
raised the issue of self-defense. The defendant objected, claiming that the
written confession was obtained in violation of his right to counsel and
should not have been admitted into evidence.'1 2 The objections were over-
ruled, and the entire confession was introduced when Nehman took the
stand during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. The state's argument on
appeal was that even if the judge had erred in admitting the inculpatory
parts of the defendant's statement, the defendant had cured that error by
introducing the entire statement. In rejecting the state's argument, the court
cited an exception to the general rule that error is not waived if the defend-
ant puts on the same kind of evidence "only to rebut, destroy, or explain the
effect of the evidence."' "13 In Parker v. State1 14 the First District Court of
Appeals held in a DWI case that the denial of the jury's request to view a
videotape, properly admitted into evidence, denied the defendant a fair and
impartial trial." 15
In Fielder v. State 116 the court of criminal appeals, for the first time in
Texas, permitted expert psychological testimony in a case where the "bat-
tered wife syndrome" defense was raised. The court reasoned that the expert
established through her testimony that the average lay person had no basis
for understanding the conduct of a woman who endured an abusive relation-
ship.17 Indeed, the state, in its cross-examination of the defendant, sought
to capitalize on the apparent incongruity of one who stayed in a relationship
in which she was continually and repeatedly subjected to physical, mental,
and psychological abuse from her spouse. The court held that the expert
testimony was relevent to the issues of the trial if it could help the trier of
fact to reconcile the incongruity." 8
In Rutledge v. State 19 the court of criminal appeals construed the proper
use of "have you heard" questions. A witness was called as a punishment
witness for the defendant. On direct examination, he testified only to his
own personal knowledge of the defendant and not to the defendent's general
reputation in the community. On cross-examination, the state proceeded to
ask whether the witness had heard of various extraneous acts involving the
110. "Curative admissibility" is used by reviewing courts when they have found error in
admitting evidence over timely objection. The court then determines whether the defendant
presented the same evidence or testimony to which he previously objected. If so, the error is
considered "cured" by the defendant's action of putting the testimony or evidence before the
trier of fact. See Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
111. 742 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no pet.).
112. See Nehman v. State, 721 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (prior opinion in
same case).
113. 742 S.W.2d at 103 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454,
456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
114. 745 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
115. Id. at 937.
116. 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
117. Id. at 321.
118. Id.
119. 749 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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defendant. The Dallas court of appeals relied on Livingston v. State 120 in
affirming the conviction, finding that the witness' testimony encompassed "a
broad range of character traits, going so far as to infer general good charac-
ter." ' 21 The court of criminal appeals reversed the punishment phase of the
trial, implicitly overruling Livingston in the process.' 22
One of the more intriguing opinions relating to evidentiary issues is that of
Zani v. State,123 which involved the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony.
The case involved a murder of a convenience store clerk where there was no
eye witness to the shooting, forcing the state to rely on circumstantial evi-
dence. One witness, however, allegedly saw someone in the store near the
time of the shooting, but could describe that individual only as a white male.
While under hypnosis, the witness gave a description of a man he saw behind
the counter of the store. Following hypnosis, the witness picked Zani's pic-
ture out of a photo spread. At trial, the witness testified that he was positive
that Zani was the man he had seen in the store. The defense objected to the
hypnotically induced testimony as not being scientifically reliable. Follow-
ing a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court decided the testimony was
sufficiently reliable to be submitted to the jury for consideration, with the
fact of hypnosis going solely to the weight the jury might choose to assign it.
Relying on the U. S. Supreme Court opinion of Rock v. Arkansas, 24 the
court of criminal appeals refused to hold that hypnotically induced testi-
mony was per se inadmissible. 125 Most of the majority opinion concerns
factors to be considered by both the trial court and the reviewing court in
determining whether hypnotically enhanced testimony is sufficiently reliable
to be admissible under the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 126
120. 589 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
121. Rutledge v. State, 693 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd in part, 749
S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
122. Rutledge v. State, 749 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Although the court did
not specifically overrule Livingston, it pointed out that Livingston relied upon and followed law
announced in Childs v. State, 491 S.W. 2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Childs was explicitly
overruled by the court in Ward v. State, 591 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
123. 758 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
124. 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2711, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 49 (1987).
125. Apparently, but for the decision in Rock v. Arkansas, the court of criminal appeals
would have adopted a per se exclusionary rule. After a lengthy discussion of decisions from
other jurisdictions regarding the issue, Judge Clinton, writing for the majority, stated:
[W]e would likely follow those jurisdictions which have fashioned a rule of per
se exclusion of any evidence not documented or otherwise memorialized as the
product of prehypnotic memory. The recent opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Rock v. Arkansas, however, has rendered such a position
untenable.
Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 242 (citation omitted).
126. Regarding this threshold issue, the court held:
Factors involved in determining trustworthiness of hypnotic recall include, but
are not limited to ... : "the level of training in the clinical uses and forensic
applications of hypnosis by the person performing the hypnosis; the hypnotist's
independence from law enforcement investigators, prosecution, and defense; the
existence of a record of any information given or known by the hypnotist con-
cerning the case prior to the hypnosis session; the existence of a written or re-
corded account of the facts as the hypnosis subject remembers them prior to
undergoing hypnosis; the creation of recordings of all contacts between the hyp-
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Another issue raised in Zani concerned proper procedures for conducting
pretrial hearings. At the hearing in Zani the trial court allowed the state to
present evidence in support of admitting the hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony, but would not allow the defendant to call his expert witness. The
court of criminal appeals held it an abuse of discretion to hear testimony
from only one side. 127 The trial court, however, did allow the defendant's
expert to testify to the jury during the trial itself, thus the trial court's error
was not dispositive of any issue presented on appeal.
Several cases from various courts addressed issues related primarily to
child abuse type cases. In 1987, the court of criminal appeals in Long v.
State 128 held a portion of article 38.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure 29 unconstitutional in that it deprived the defendant of his right of
confrontation under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution.' 30
The portion had allowed the state to introduce a videotaped statement by a
child in an abuse case. Since the Long decision, the appellate courts have
disagreed as to whether the introduction of the videotape' 3' is harmful per
se, thus automatically calling for reversal, or whether it is subject to harm
analysis.' 32 The court of criminal appeals settled the dispute in Mallory v.
State.133 In Mallory the court cited the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Harrington v. California,134 Chapman v. California,135 and Delaware
v. Van-Arvsall 1 36 for the proposition that "the constitutionally improper
notist and the subject; the presence of persons other than the hypnotist and the
subject during any phase of the hypnosis session, as well as the location of the
session; the appropriateness of the induction and memory retrieval techniques
used; the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the kind of memory loss in-
volved; and the existence of any evidence to corroborate the hypnotically-en-
hanced testimony."
Id. at 243-44 (quoting People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1017 (Colo. 1987)). Additionally, the
court held that if the trial court, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, should find
by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony was trustworthy and that the proceedings
did not substantially impair the ability of the opponent to fairly test the witness's recall by
cross-examination, the judge may admit the testimony. Id. at 244.
127. Id. at 244-45.
128. 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
129. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) provides:
The recording of an oral statement of the child made before the indictment is
returned or the complaint has been filed is admissible into evidence if the court
makes a determination that the factual issues of identity or actual occurrence
were fully and fairly inquired into in a detached manner by a neutral individual
experienced in child abuse cases that seeks to find the truth of the matter.
130. The court held that the admission of a child witness' videotaped statement violated
the defendant's right to cross-examination and confrontation as well as his due process rights.
742 S.W.2d at 318-20.
131. See, e.g., Foty v. State, 755 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
no pet.).
132. See, e.g., Offor v. State, 749 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no pet.); Verell v.
State, 749 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd); Amescua v. State, 751
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no pet.).
133. 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
134. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
135. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
136. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
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denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other
confrontation clause errors, is subject to harmless-error analysis."' 13 7 In
adopting this principle, the court stated: "[A] violation of such a right does
not invariably tarnish the truth finding process to the extent that automatic
reversal is called for in every case. Therefore .... a harmless error analysis is
necessary and appropriate."' 138 Although the court relied extensively on the
Chapman rationale, it determined the Chapman discretion was no longer
available and the test for harmless error was provided in the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 139 The court went on to note that harmless error anal-
ysis was a progressive process. 14 First, the appellate court must find that
error exists. 14 1 Second, if an error is discovered, the appellate court is obli-
gated to reverse the judgment below unless the appellate court determines
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the con-
viction or to the punishment imposed. 142 If the appellate court cannot make
that determination beyond a reasonable doubt, it is required to reverse the
judgment. 143
In Tolbert v. State 144 the court of criminal appeals faced another Long
scenario. Unlike Long, however, the case had been tried to the court and not
a jury. In affirming the conviction, the court relied on the generally accepted
presumption that, when the trial court acts as trier of fact, it will disregard
any inadmissible evidence. 14 5 Thus, it was incumbent upon the defendant to
show that the trial court considered the inadmissible evidence in reaching
the verdict or in determining punishment. 146
In another child abuse case, Kirkpatrick v. State 147 the Dallas court of
appeals held that expert testimony may not directly bolster the testimony of
a child victim. 14 8 The court relied on the rule that a witness may not give an
opinion as to the truth or falsity of other testimony. 149 In Russell v. State,1 50
however, the court of criminal appeals held that, if expert testimony was
137. 752 S.W.2d at 569 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
138. Id. at 569.
139. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(2) provides that a judgment shall be reversed if the record
reveals error "unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment."
140. 752 S.W.2d at 569.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 570.
143. Id. at 569-70.
144. 743 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
145. Id. at 633; see also Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
(presumption that court as trier of fact disregards inadmissible evidence).
146. See Tamminen v. State, 653 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
147. 747 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd).
148. Id. at 836.
149. See Avala v. State, 352 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962). The court did note,
however, that expert testimony was proper regarding the general behavioral traits of child
victims such as delay in reporting the incident, recantation, truancy, embarrassment, running
away from home, and inconsistent versions of abuse. This type of testimony explains to the
jurors that such behavior, which might otherwise be attributed to inaccuracy or falsification, is
typical of the class of victims and does not necessarily indicate a lack of credibility. 747
S.W.2d at 835-36.
150. 749 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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admitted in the trial, the trial court should have avoided including an in-
struction in the jury charge drawing attention to that particular evidence. 151
The court reasoned that such an instruction constituted a comment on the
weight of the evidence because it had a tendency to single out certain testi-
mony and to comment on it. 152
Alexander v. State 153 involved the admission of extraneous acts in a case
involving an aggravated sexual assault of a child. The trial court justified the
admission of the extraneous acts by finding the acts sufficiently similar in
nature to demonstrate a continuing scheme or course of conduct and unnat-
ural attention displayed by the defendant to young girls of tender ages. Con-
sequently, the trial court found the probative effect of the evidence
outweighed the prejudicial effect.. Further, the trial court included an in-
struction to the jury limiting consideration of these acts only in determining
scheme, design or course of conduct of a defendant.154 The Eastland court
of appeals affirmed the conviction, relying on McDonald v. State 155 and
Johnston v. State. 156 Both of those cases, however, were expressly overruled
in Boutwell v. State.157 Thus, the court of criminal appeals remanded the
case to the court of appeals to review the facts pursuant to Boutwell.158
C The Jury Charge
In Rose v. State 159 the court of criminal appeals rewrote its opinion hold-
ing the parole jury charge unconstitutional. 160 The Rose story is extremely
convoluted. 161 So many opinions concurred in part as well as dissented that
to tell exactly what was decided is somewhat difficult. It is clear, however,
that (1) the parole charge is unconstitutional 62 and (2) in reviewing a Rose
error, appellate courts should apply the harm analysis required by rule
151. Id. at 80. The instruction in Russell stated: "You are instructed that you are not
bound by the testimony offered by a witness qualified as an expert. You may give it the weight
to which you find it is entitled and may weigh such testimony with all other evidence offered in
this case." Id. at 77.
152. Id. at 78 (citing Chambers v. State, 700 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
153. 753 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
154. Id. at 402.
155. 513 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
156. 418 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
157. 719 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
158. 753 S.W.2d at 402.
159. 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
160. The statutory parole charge is embodied in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07,
§ 4 (Vernon 1977). In essence, it informs the jury of some of the aspects of parole and the
effects of parole and good time on the sentence imposed in a given case.
161. When Rose was initially decided by the court of criminal appeals, the general consen-
sus was that the parole charge violated the due process clause of the Texas Constitution, (TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 19), and that error would be judged according to Almanza v. State, 686
S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The court, however, on its own motion for rehearing,
subsequently determined that the parole charge violated the separation of powers clause, and
the due course of law provisions, TEX. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 13, 19 and that the Almanza
standard was inappropriate. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d at 552 (Justice Campbell writing opin-
ion on court's own motion for rehearing).
162. 752 S.W.2d at 537.
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81 (b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 163 In reaching the latter
conclusion, the court rejected the argument that the harm analysis should
follow the procedure set out in Almanza v. State.164 Under Almanza, if the
trial court overrules a proper objection or a proper instruction, reversal is
required if there is "some harm to the accused from the error."1 65 Almanza
further instructed that several factors will determine the actual degree of
harm, including the jury charge as a whole, the state of the evidence, argu-
ment of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the entire
trial record. 166 Perhaps the most significant distinction between harm analy-
sis pursuant to rule 81 and that of Almanza relates to the burden of proof.
Under Almanza, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate harm. 167
Rule 81 places the burden on the state to demonstrate that the error was
harmless.1 68 As noted by the First District Court of Appeals in Herring v.
State, few appellants can show harm from a jury charge error. 169 Therefore,
placing the burden on appellants will usually be fatal to their claim. 170 For
purposes of the harm analysis, the Rose opinion provides some guidelines as
to what should be considered. Among these are whether the trial court in
addition to the parole charge also gave a curative instruction, the facts of the
case generally, and the criminal record of the accused. 17 1
The court of criminal appeals held in Reyes v. State 172 that, in order to
support a deadly weapon finding when the defendant is prosecuted on the
basis of the law of parties, there must be a specific finding by the trier of fact
that the accused personally used or exhibited a deadly weapon.173 In Wood-
fox v. State 174 the court of criminal appeals held that the defendant need not
testify nor put on any evidence to be entitled to an instruction on a defensive
issue of mistake of fact. 175 The rule is reasserted that, when a defensive the-
ory is raised by evidencefrom any source and a charge is properly requested,
it must be submitted to the jury. 176 In Johnson v. State 177 the court of crimi-
nal appeals held that when evidence raises an issue as to whether appellant
was guilty under the law of parties pursuant to section 7.02 of the Texas
Penal Code, 178 it is error for the trial judge not to explicitly apply the law of
163. Id. at 555; see supra note 139.
164. 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
165. Id. at 171.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 171; see LaPoint v. State, 750 S.W.2d 180, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Herring
v. State, 752 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), rev'd, 758 S.W.2d 283(Tex. Crim. App. 1988)); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1974).
168. Herring v. State, 752 S.W.2d at 173-74.
169. Id. at 174.
170. Id. at 173.
171. Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554-55.
172. 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
173. Id. at 432-33; see Travelstead v. State, 693 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
174. 742 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
175. Id. at 409.
176. Id. (emphasis added); see Sanders v. State, 707 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);
Gavia v. State, 488 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
177. 739 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
178. The statute provides: "A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by
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parties to the facts of a particular case. 179
In Kelly v. State' 80 injury to an elderly individual pursuant to section
22.04 of the Penal Code was found to be a result offense and thus the jury
charge must apply the culpable mental state to the result of the alleged con-
duct.18' Although the statute appears to impose strict liability, the court
ruled that the mental state of the defendant applies to the conduct of the
defendant that caused the result.1 82
IV. APPEALS
The First District Court of Appeals in Jiles v. State183 held that oral no-
tice of appeal could, in some cases, be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of
an appellate court. Timely notice of appeal was orally given but neither the
appellant nor his attorney signed a written notice of appeal. Relying on rule
83 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure' 84 the court held that the fail-
ure could be characterized as a "defect of form" thus dismissal of the appeal
was not required. 18- Indeed, the court implicitly ruled that, as a practical
matter, the failure of the defendant's attorney to file a written motion for
appeal would likely be ineffective assistance of counsel,' 86 pursuant to the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Evitts v. Lucey.' 87
In Ex Parte Lopez '8 8 the court of criminal appeals held that an indigent
defendant is entitled to appointed counsel upon remand to a court of ap-
peals. In this case, the petitioner alleged that his court-appointed counsel on
appeal withdrew from the case upon receiving notice of the reversal by the
court of appeals. Apparently, the accused was never informed of his attor-
ney's withdrawal. Ultimately, because the state of the record was unclear,
another if ... acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits,
encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense ... TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
179. 739 S.W.2d at 305.
180. 748 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
181. Id. at 239; see also Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (injury-to-
child statute is not strict liability law), Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985) (injury-to-child statute is not strict liability law).
182. Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d at 238-39.
183. 751 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
184. TEX. R. APp. P. 83 provides:
A judgment shall not be affirmed or reversed or an appeal dismissed for defects
or irregularities in appellate procedure, either of form or substance, without al-
lowing a reasonable time to correct or amend such defects or irregularities...
except that in criminal cases late filing of the transcript or statement of facts
may be permitted on a showing that otherwise the appellant may be deprived of
effective assistance of counsel.
185. 751 S.W.2d at 622. The court noted that Shute v. State, 744 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988), upon which the state relied, held that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing
that cause for lack of jurisdiction. The court, however, noted that there was no discussion in
Shute as to whether the court of appeals had other options other than dismissal. Thus, the
court concluded that other options were available. 751 S.W.2d at 621.
186. 751 S.W.2d at 621-22.
187. 469 U.S. 387, 390-91 (1985) (lawyer who failed to file "Statement of Appeal," as re-
quired by Kentucky procedural rule deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal).
188. 745 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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the court remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings.18 9 The
court of criminal appeals further clarified and perhaps expanded the role of
the trial lawyer in the appellate process in Ex Parte Axel.190 The facts were
a classic example of the natural ambiguity of the attorney-client relationship
that arises at the conclusion of a trial. Although the accused in Axel in-
formed his retained counsel that he desired to appeal his conviction, the at-
torney neither filed a notice of appeal nor filed a motion to withdraw. 91 The
court held that the trial court has the discretion to, but no duty or responsi-
bility to, inform a defendant of his right to appeal. 92 That duty rests with
the trial counsel. Whether retained or appointed, trial counsel maintains an
obligation and responsibility to consult with and fully inform his client con-
cerning the meaning and effect of the court's judgment; the client's right to
appeal from that judgment; the necessity of giving notice of appeal; and tak-
ing other steps to pursue an appeal. 193 The trial counsel should also express
his professional judgment as to possible grounds and merit for appeal.' 94
The ultimate decision to appeal, however, belongs to the client. 195 The court
also noted that, should trial counsel not intend to represent the accused on
appeal, the attorney should file a written notice of appeal signed by the de-
fendant reflecting the desire of the defendant to appeal, along with a contem-
poraneous motion to withdraw showing good cause. 196
189. Id. at 29-30. Although perhaps overstated, the practical impact of the court's holding
in this case is that the appellate lawyer is duty bound to his client through the appellate process
through the issuance of the mandate, and not just until the brief is filed in the appellate court.
190. 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
191. See Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
192. 757 S.W.2d at 371. In a hearing called by the trial court, the attorney testified that he
did not give notice of appeal after sentencing because he never intended to file an appeal and
there was no need to file a motion to withdraw because the case had been concluded. The
defendant testified that he had attempted to contact his counsel about the appeal but did not
receive a reply. Id.
193. Id. at 374.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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